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Abstract  
We discover mispricing in an apparently transparent market - the European soccer betting 
market. Efficiency differences between countries are accounted for by variations in league 
competitiveness. We conclude that barriers to efficiency (e.g., risk evaluation problems) may 
remain in transparent markets.   
 
1.0 Introduction 
The recent financial crisis has been attributed to many competing causes. Prominent amongst 
these are inappropriately high risk exposure by financial institutions and enhanced trading in 
increasingly complex financial assets, where reliable evaluation of fundamental asset risk is 
elusive and/or attended by significant transactions costs. The crisis has also prompted more 
fundamental questions regarding the allocative effectiveness of markets. For example, Paul 
Volcker, former Federal Reserve Chairman, claimed that “among the causes of the recent 
financial crisis was an unjustified faith in rational expectations [and] market efficiencies” 
(Volcker, 2011, p.1). This has led authorities in the US and Europe to initiate moves towards 
transparent markets that have “highly visible prices and volumes, broad market participation 
including retail agents, and elimination of counterparty risk through standardized margins” 
(Acharya et al., 2009, p.169).  
We explore whether an expectation of efficiency in a financial market, which is untroubled by 
the stress factors identified above, is warranted or whether barriers to efficiency remain. To 
achieve this we investigate a market operating under ostensibly favourable circumstances. 
Specifically, we investigate the European soccer betting market, which deals in simple, 
commodity-type, state-contingent assets, where asset values are determined exclusively by the 
outcomes of soccer matches, with only three outcomes possible (home or away win, draw).  The 
market is internet-based, suggesting relative freedom from transactions costs (Smith and 
Brynjolfsson, 2000). Unwarranted inflation of trader expectations is avoided by the daily stream 
of final market outcomes which invites a realistic view of returns prospects.   
2.0 Material and Methods 
2.1 Testing for Inefficiency 
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We analyse data from Gamebookers, a major internet bookmaker, relating to the European 
soccer betting market. Odds for each potential match outcome and result data are collected for 
52,865 soccer matches across twenty two leagues in eleven European countries between 1999 
and 2008.  
Procedure 1 tests for weak form efficiency by examining whether expected profitability differs 
across odds values, both for individual leagues and in aggregate. It also explores whether prices 
(odds) exhibit favourite-longshot bias (FLB), the under/overestimation of the probability of 
favourites/longshots; a well-established manifestation of market inefficiency. Odds are 
segmented into twelve categories, and match outcome data are used to calculate average profit 
per category, assuming level staking on each betting opportunity. We then determine for each 
category the expected profit to a unit bet, allowing for `overround’ (percentage by which the 
sum of implicit probabilities for the three possible event outcomes exceeds one) and we 
compare the ratio of actual to expected returns across odds categories. 
Procedure 2 employs a conditional logit (CL) regression, with the outcome of each game as the 
dependent variable and log of the odds-implied probability (Lodds) as the independent variable. 
The dependent variable takes value 1 for the event that occurred (e.g., draw) and 0 for those 
that did not occur. When the coefficient of Lodds is 1 there is no FLB; when it is significantly 
less/more than 1 the chances of favourites are over/under-estimated.  
 
2.2 Explaining Efficiency Differentials 
Following Vaughan Williams and Paton (1997), we explore the role of transactions costs 
(measured via the overround) in explaining observed inefficiency differentials. Procedure 3 
examines the log-likelihoods of two CL models, both with the outcome of each game as the 
dependent variable and containing an interaction term as an independent variable: Lodds X 
level of transaction costs (to ensure this term varies across the three possible game outcomes). 
Model 1  includes Lodds as an additional independent variable; Model 2 includes Lodds 
multiplied by a dummy variable, which takes the value 1 if a league displays significant FLB 
(from results in Table 2) and 0 otherwise. Clearly, if differences in transactions costs can explain 
differential FLB between betting markets, there should be no difference in the information 
content of these two models. 
We also consider whether differences in league competitiveness explain cross-league 
differentials in FLB. If odds-setters underestimate cross-league differences in competitiveness, 
less competitive leagues will exhibit greater FLB as favourites will be assigned odds which 
understate, to a greater degree, their true winning probability. We explore this via Procedures 4 
and 5. In Procedure 4, we use mean absolute goal difference per game per season (meanAGD) in 
each league as a proxy for league competitiveness in that season. A league’s competitiveness 
across the ten seasons (1999-2008) is then determined as the mean of these seasonal 
competitiveness values. We then explore the degree of correlation between a league’s 
competitiveness and the FLB exhibited in that league, where the FLB is determined by the 
coefficient of Lodds in a conditional logit model estimated across all ten years of games for a 
given league, with the outcome of each game as the dependent variable.   
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Procedure 5 ensures that the results relating to the relationship between competitiveness and 
efficiency are robust. We assess the competiveness of each league by the degree to which odds 
accurately account for each team’s actual winning probability. This assumes that in highly 
competitive leagues, results are less predictable. Consequently, we employ the McFadden R2 
statistic associated with each league’s estimated CL function (Lodds as the sole independent 
variable), based on all games played across the ten seasons. This statistic serves as a proxy for a 
league’s predictability and hence competitiveness. Correlation between this competitiveness 
statistic and FLB is assessed for each league. 
3.0 Results 
3.1 Efficiency Characteristics 
Profitability variations across odds ranges are observed for the aggregate sample, indicating a 
degree of positive FLB, and therefore inefficiency, overall (Table 1). The results of estimating 
the CL model (Procedure 2) confirm the positive FLB, the majority of leagues displaying a 
significantly positive coefficient for Lodds (Table 2). However, the results indicate significant 
cross-league diversity, in terms of the magnitude and sign of FLB, an important result given the 
fundamental similarity of the markets. 
Table 1: Mean profit and actual/expected returns across odds categories for betting markets 
associated with 52,865 soccer games across 22 European soccer leagues (1999 – 2008). 
 
Decimal odds 
category 
Mean profit 
per bet 
Actual/expected 
return 
1.5 -0.034 1.085 
>1.5, 1.8 -0.072 1.043 
>1.8, 2.0 -0.069 1.046 
>2.0, 2.4  -0.081 1.033 
>2.4, 2.8 -0.111 0.999 
>2.8, 3.1 -0.118 0.991 
>3.1, 3.2 -0.134 0.973 
>3.2, 3.3 -0.108 1.002 
>3.3, 3.5 -0.112 0.998 
>3.5, 4.0 -0.161 0.943 
>4.0, 5.0 -0.157 0.947 
>5.0 -0.28 0.809 
 
Table 2: Results of estimating a CL model with an index function made up of interaction terms 
between Lodds and binary variables which indicate the league in which the particular game is 
played (52,865 soccer games, 1999 -  2008).  
Interaction 
terms1: binary 
variable 
identifying 
league x Lodds 
Coefficient z-value 
Spain2 0.936 14.70*** 
England3 0.989 18.71*** 
Scotland1 0.999 12.12*** 
England1 1.019 20.61*** 
England2 1.029 20.51*** 
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Spain1 1.044 20.95*** 
Scotland2 1.044 12.20*** 
Germany2 1.103 16.45*** 
Germany1 1.117+ 20.13*** 
England Conf. 1.125 13.52*** 
France1 1.128+ 19.10*** 
Portugal1 1.136+ 19.45*** 
Turkey1 1.170+ 20.66*** 
England Prem. 1.191+ 24.78*** 
Scotland Prem. 1.194+ 21.10*** 
France2 1.204+ 18.11*** 
Belgium1 1.208+ 22.58*** 
Netherlands1 1.247+ 24.66*** 
Italy1 1.253+ 24.27*** 
Italy2 1.270+ 21.06*** 
Greece1 1.300+ 22.30*** 
Scotland3 1.330+ 17.78*** 
1.CountryN: Soccer league N in that country x Lodds 
+ Coefficient greater than 1 with 95% confidence 
*** Significant at 0.1% 
 
3.2 Explaining Efficiency Differentials 
Table 3 details the results of Procedure 3. A likelihood ratio test confirms that the log-likelihood 
of Model 2 (which accounts for the efficiency of the betting market associated with the league in 
which the game is played) is significantly greater than the log-likelihood of the CL model which 
does not account for this factor (Model 1): Likelihood ratio=46.43, 𝜒2
2(. 01) = 9.22 . This 
confirms that even when transactions costs are fully discounted there is still a significant 
difference between markets with positive FLB and those where FLB is absent. This invites the 
conclusion that transactions costs do not account for differences in FLB in the markets 
examined.  
Table 3: Results of estimating two CL models with index functions made up of an interaction 
term between Lodds and the transaction costs in a given game (cj) and, in Model 1 , Lodds, and in 
Model 2, interaction terms between Lodds and binary variables which account for whether a 
particular market is weak form efficient (e1) or displays positive FLB(e2).  
 
Predictor Coefficient z-value 
Model 1   
cjLodds 1.0125 1.39 
 Lodds 0.0116 0.01 
Log-
likelihood 
-53392.6  
   
Model 2   
cj Lodds 0.7978 1.08 
e1 Lodds 0.1358 0.17 
e2 Lodds 0.3142 0.38 
Log-
likelihood 
-53369.4  
 * Significant at 5% 
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The results of Procedures 4 and 5 are presented in Table 4. Correlations between the degree of 
FLB and, respectively, the mean AGD and the McFadden R2 statistics are 0.627 (t=3.60) and 
0.842(t=6.98), confirm that competitiveness is a highly significant factor in explaining cross-
league efficiency differences.   
Table 4: Results of estimating coefficients of interaction terms between Lodds and binary 
variables indicating the league in which the particular game is played, in CL functions, estimated 
employing the 52,865 soccer games, 1999-2008 (the coefficients identify the degree of FLB in 
each league),  together with associated McFadden R2 values and mean absolute goal difference 
for the respective leagues. 
 
League Coefficient 
identifying 
degree of 
FLB 
McFadden R2 Mean absolute goal 
difference 
Spain2 0.936 0.0305 0.2034 
England3 0.989 0.0417 0.2740 
Scotland1 0.999 0.0522 0.3540 
England1 1.019 0.0475 0.2722 
England2 1.029 0.0474 0.2816 
Spain1 1.044 0.0767 0.3074 
Scotland2 1.090 0.0571 0.3357 
Germany2 1.103 0.065 0.3204 
Germany1 1.117 0.0886 0.3457 
England Conf. 1.125 0.0557 0.2325 
France1 1.128 0.0653 0.2642 
Portugal1 1.136 0.1040 0.3564 
Turkey1 1.170 0.1198 0.3935 
England Prem. 1.191 0.1136 0.3704 
Scotland Prem. 1.194 0.1500 0.4722 
France2 1.204 0.0621 0.2387 
Belgium1 1.208 0.1193 0.4887 
Netherlands1 1.247 0.1430 0.4837 
Italy1 1.253 0.1276 0.3732 
Italy2 1.27 0.0927 0.2612 
Scotland3 1.314 0.1226 0.5770 
Greece1 1.344 0.1873 0.4313 
 
4.0 Conclusion 
This study analyses a financial market unfettered by factors held to inhibit efficient market 
outcomes in other contexts. It demonstrates that, even under such favourable conditions, 
inefficiency can be significant. Whilst transactions costs are ruled out as a direct cause of the 
inefficiency, an influential factor is a difficulty in assessing the probabilities associated with 
alternative outcomes of events which determine the traded assets’ values. This suggests that 
markets may invariably be susceptible to fundamental risk evaluation problems. Consequently, 
in supporting markets to operate with tolerable levels of inefficiency, it is important to avoid 
institutional features or encouraging behaviours which add further stress to the appropriate 
valuation of assets and thereby the market’s viability. To this end, prohibiting the development 
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of exotic derivative assets and discouraging bubbles of positive sentiment may contribute to 
sustainable, if not wholly efficient, markets. 
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